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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH HODGES, Respcmdent,
V·S .

I. A. SMOOT and C. M. CROFT,
Appellants.

Respondent's Brief.
NEWEL G. DAINES,
Attorney for Respondent.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEP·H HODGES, Respondent,
vs.
I. A. SMOOT and C. M. CROFT,
A pp.ellants..

STATEMENT OF CASE.
There are three causes of action in this .case. The
first based on a promissory note for $1300.00, and the second on one for $529.20, and the third is stated in two
counts. The first count of the third cause of action states
a cause of action on a note for $3,931.30, which it is alleged is a renewal of the note set out in the second .count of
the third cause of action in the sum of $2835.00.
As a defense to the first cause of action, the defendants plead the statutes of limitations, second that the
said note was given for the use and benefit of the Gordon
Creek Coal Company; and, third, that said plaintiff agreed
to surrender said note for stock in the Gordon Creek Coal
Company.
A.s an affirmative defense to the second cause of action, the defendants plead that the note in question was
given as an accommodation to the plaintiff.
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As a defense to the first count in the third cause of
action, the defendants attempt to plead that the note in
question was delivered conditionally, said condition being
that it was not to become effective unless the signature
of one W. W. Seegmiller was obtained on said note with
the two defendants. Plaintiff mai~ntains that this is the
only question in the whole case raised by the pleadings
that should have been submitted to the jury.
As a defense to the second count in the third cause
of action, the defendants allege that said note was barred
by the statute of limitations, and that the same was paid
and delivered toW. W. Seegmiller for ·ca~ncellation. The
case was tried to a jury, and the judge indicated that he
was going to submit the case to the jury on a special verdict. Plaintiff requested that the jury be required to
bring in a general verdict on the three .causes of action,
but the Court denied the request and submitted the special
interrogatories (Tr. 117, 171, 181) ..
At the close of the evidence on the first day of the
trial the plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict in
all three causes of action; whereupon the defendants re9uested the court to direct a verdict for the defendants on
the third cause of action. The Court then indicated that
it was his intention, when the court again convened, to
deny both motions and to submit the case to the jury on
special interrrogatories (Tr. 171). When the court did convene, some evidence was submitted, but the case wrs sub-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

mitted to the jury on special interrogatories. Counsel for
plaintiff requested a general verdict (Tr. 181, 182).
The jury returned the special verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, which said findings or special verdict was filed
May 9, 1939 (Tr. 40). On May 23, 1939, defendants' attor.ney filed a notice of motion for new trial, and on May
25, 1939, filed a motion for a new trial (Tr. 41-43). Coun-

sel for plaintiff in open court moved to strike the motion
and notice of motion on the ground that it was not filed in
time (Minute Entry Tr. p. 214).

The Court however,

granted counsel for defendants time to make a showing,
which ·showing consisted of an affidavit filed by the attorney for the defendants that he did not know that the
time for filing a motion for a new trial had started to run
from the time the special verdict was filed (Tr. 50, 51) .
The Court permitted the motion to be filed and heard the
same, but denied it, and ordered judgment and findings to
be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. (Minute Entry Tr. 214). The findings and judgment were dated June 8, 1940, and notice of judgment
June 10, 1940, whereupon after some extension of time,
notice of appeal was served and the bill of exception
settled. However, no abstract of the record was ever prepared or served on counsel, and no assignments of error
were ever made, ex:cept what is argued in counsel's brief.
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REPLY TO ARGUMENT.

In counsel's brief he ·states, without having made an
assignment of errors, that he relies on three errors comit.
ted by the Court, to-wit: F'ir.st: That the .court erred in
submitting the case to the jury because of the fact that
both plaintiff and defendants made a motion for a directed verdict on the third cause of action; Second: the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the findings of the jury;
and, Third: prejudice of the jury.
We assume that this court will consider only the
grounds stated or assigned as error in the appellants'
brief. Therefore, we will discuss .no other matters in our
brief, except to reply to arguments of counsel.
We maintain that the court did not commit error in
submitting the case to the jury on the third ·cause of action, for the following reasons.
First: That at the time the motions were made for
a directed verdict a•nd denied, the court indicated his intention to submit the case to the jury on special findings,
and asked both parties to 'SUbmit instructions if they desired. To this statement of the court the defendants made
no objection and never indicated that the court should
take the case away from the jury except to grant or deny
their motion and took no exception thereto, and thereby
waived any objections they might have had and said matter cannot be considered for the first time in the Supreme
Court.
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Second: The rule which counsel seeks to invoke in this
matter is based on the theory that by both parties making
a motion for a directed verdict, they each waive a jury
and thereby consent that the case may be decided by the
trial judge. But where instructions to the jury are submitted, the Courts hold that such rule is not to be invoked,
even in those jurisdictions where the rule applies, and our
Supreme Court has held such to be the law.
Third: That the matter of submitting special findings
to the jury is within the discretion of the trial judge, and
unless such discretion is abused error cannot be predicated thereon..
1. Obie.otion Not Made and Hence Waived.- Title
104, Chapter 39, Section .1 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
defines an exception and states what exceptions are saved
by the statutes, and states: "The exception must be taken
at the time the decision is made, except as provided in the
next section." Title 104, Chapter 39, Section 2, enumerates
the exceptions which are saved by the statutes, and the
improper submission of a case to the jury is not therein
enumerated, hence the objection would have to be taken
at the time, or else it is waived. In discussing this question the Court in the case of Felice vs. Biscardi, 246 Pac.
535, 67 Utah 171, said:
"The defendant, however, ·contends that the
court erred in submitting the issue of payment to
a jury. There are two answers to the contention,
either one of which is conclusive against the de-
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fendant: (1) the record does not disclose any objection or exception to the court's action in calling
a jury and in ·submitting the issue to it; and (2)
even if there had been such an objection and exception the matter of calling a jury as advisory to
the court was clearly within the sound discretion
of the ·court, and hence this assignment must fail."
This question cannot be considered when raised for
the first time in this Court.

Many cases could be cited,

but we think the following should be sufficient:
Geros vs. Harries, 236 Pac. 220, 65 U tab 227;
Van Cott vs. Wall, 178 Pac. 42, 53 Utah 272.
WHERE

INSTRUCTIONS

ARE

REQUESTED

CASE IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO JURY. On the second
point ·counsel has answered the question himself in his
brief, as he quotes Christensen v.s. Utah Rapid Transit
Company, 83 Utah 231, 27 Pac. (2nd) 468, and Wood vs.
Kinter, 86 Utah, 279, 43 Pa·c. (2nd) 192, wherein this
court holds that if instructions to the jury are requested
that the rule is waived and cannot be invoked. See also,
64 C. J. 440, and in particular notes 85 and 86.
3.

MATTER WITHIN DISCRETION OF

JUDGE.

TRIAL

We submit that where there is a question of

fact to be decided and a jury has been requested aJnd instructed, the trial judge may always submit the question
of fact to the jury without committing error.
J. 440 and cases there cited.)

(See 64 C.

An error might be commit-

ted by the trial judge in taking a case away from the jury
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2. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE. We
now turn to the purported a·ssignment No. 2, wherein i.t is
claimed that the evidence is insufficient to support the
special verdict. In this connection we admit that counsel
has correctly stated the law and we adopt his citations.
In his quotation from Jackson vs. James, 97 Utah 41,
89 Pac. (2nd) 235, we find:
"This being an action fliaw and the jury having
found the facts, we ·cannot disturb the verdict if
there is evidence from which a jury as reasonable
men ·could, so have found."

On page 21 of counsel's brief in discussing the answer

to special interrogatory No. 3, we submit that counsel has
stated himself right out of court wherein he says:
"Here one witness testified that the signatures
were absolute, and two witnesses testified that they
were conditional."
What more ·can be required? The jury had a right to
believe the one witness as against two if they choose to
do so.
The court gave the jury the following stock instruc-

tions, which are given in practically every jury case and
conceded to be the law, to-wit: (Tr. 36)
By the preponderance of the evidence is meant
the greater weight of the evidence, that which i1s
the more convincing as to its truth. It is not nec-essarily determined my the 'number of witnesses
for or against a proposition, although, all other
things being equal, it may be so determined.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
You are the exclusive judges of all questions of
fact, and of the credibility of witnesses. In judging of their credibility you have the right to take
into consideration their deportment on the witness
stand, their interest, if aflly is shown, in the result
of the suit, the reasonableness of their statements,
their apparent frankness or ·candor, or the want
of it; their opportunities to know and understand,
and their capacity to remember. You have the
right to consider any fact or circumstance in evidence which in your judgment affects the crdibility of any witness. If you believe from the evidence that any witness who has testified in this
case has knowingly and wilfully testified falsely
to any material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole testimony of ·such witness, unless
the witness is corroborated by other .credible evidence or you may give such weight to the evidence
of such witness on other points as you may think
it entitled to; the jury are the e}rclusive judges of
the weight of the testimony.
We quote from the examination of 'Mr. Hodges by Mr.
Bird: (Tr. 108)
Q.: "Now, Mr. Hodges, when the defendants signed
Exhibit "D", which is a note for thirty nine hundred dollars, did they state that they were signing upon condition,
or conditioned upon your receiving the signature of Mr.
Seegmiller?"'
A.: They didn't.
Q.: Did they say they were obliged for the entire

amount?
A.: Yes,, sir.

****

Q.: Didn't they say that they would sign only if you
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would get Seegmiller's signature? (Tr. 110.)
A.: No, they didn't.

They told me that Seegmiller

would not sign it. They were sure that he would not sign.
We submit that is very substantial evidence and entirely sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury. We do
not know what more would he necessary.
SPECIAL INTERROGATORY No. 2 and 4.
In
testifying as to the reason for the note for $529.20 Mr.
Hodges ·said: (Tr. 92).
"Q.: And is that the note sued upon in the second
cause of action? (Meaning Exhibit "B", note for $529.20.)
A.: Yes, sir.
Q.: Now, does that note have any relation to this five
hundred dollar endorsement here? (Indicating $500.00
endorsement on $1300.00
A.: Yes., sir.

~note.)

Q.: What is it?

A.: That is a renewal of the five hundred dollar note

that is endorsed on that note." (The $1300.00 note.)
Mr. Croft testified: (Tr. 140)
"Q.: What was the ·conversation at the time exhibit

"B" was signed on October 27th, 1927? (1937)
A.: If I remember right the $500.00 note was a short
time note. ·He brought this one down, if we would sign
this note, itncluding the interest, so as to bring it, that
other note up to date so that it could be used." .{Meaning
the $1300 note.)
Mr. Smoot testified as follows: (Tr. 155, 156)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
"Q.: Now, you notice this five hundred dollar endorsement on the back of the note1
A.: Yes. sir.
Q.: You didn't pay the five hudred dollars in cash?
A.: No, sir.
Q.: Was that the note that has been introduced in evi-

dence here as plaintiff's exhibit "B"?
A.: I take it, that one here, taken up as a renewal,
was to apply on that other note. I assume that." (Meaning the $1300.00 note.)
All three of these witnes·ses testified that this note
was signed to be used as an endorsement of interest on
the $1300.00 note. That is sufficient to justify the jury in
finding that the note was given for a valuable consideration as all three parties te'Stified that it was. We might
here observe that if the defendants do not owe this note
then they owe five hundred dollars more interest on the
$1300.00 note. However, we do not need to rely on that to

toll the statutes of limitations on the $1300.00 note.
In paragraph four of the first cause of action (Tr. 2)
we allege that an action was started on this note on October 15, 1935; that is, two days before it was outlawed, and
that said action remained pending until the 6th day of
December, 1939.. Counsel 'Stipulated in open court that
these facts were true, (Tr. 91-92) and the court found said
facts to be true. (Findings No. 4, Tr. 54.)
The statutes of limitations did not run while the other
action was pending and we had one year after December
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1939~

in which to file an action on said note. See Title

104, Chapter 2, Section 41 of the Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, and the following cases:
Luke vs. Bennion, 36 Utah 61, 106 Pac . 712;
Salisbury vs. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 Pac. 315;
Platz vs. International Smelting Company, 61 Utah
342, 213 Pac. 187.
We maintain, that this is an absolute answer to counsel's
argument regarding the statute of limitation on the first
cause of action. However, Mr. Hodges testified (Tr. 91)
defendants sent him a car of coal to be applied on the
several obligations and he applied $11.05 on this particular
note. The defendants testified (Tr. 148) that they sent
Mr. Hodges two cars of coal, that he paid them for one,
but they gave him the other. The jury., however, found
that it was a payment on the note and there is ample evidence to justify ·such a finding.
SPECIAIJ INTERROGATORY No.6. This question
asks whether or not the defendants acquiesed in the endorsement of $11.05 on the $1300.00 note. The fact that
another action was pending prevents the $1300.00 note
from being outlawed, so it seems to us that this question
becomes immaterial.

However, all testified that the defendants sent Mr. Hodges a car of coal. The plaintiff
testified that it was to apply on the defendants obligations
and he so applied it. The defendants said they gave it to
the plaintiff.

The jury believed the plaintiff in that re-

spect which they had a perfect right to do and as any
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reasonable person would do. Therefore, we see no necessity of arguing this point any further. As evidence that
the jury was very conscientious in their deliberation before they would make a finding on this point, they came
back into the court and had the evidence read to them.
(Tr. 185.)
SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES 5 , 7 and 8. As
the jury has already found that the $3931.50 note was not
'Conditionally delivered, but that the defendants ·were
bound thereby, the answers to question 5, 7 and 8 become
immaterial as this is the same obligation represented by
the $3931.30 note. ·These questions all have to do with
the $2.00 which it was testified the defendant Smoot gave
the son of the plaintiff. The evidence of Joseph D. Hodges, son of the plaintiff, on this point is as follows: (Tr.
page 116)
"A.: I handed Mr. Smoot the order, upon which, after
reading, he said that he was sorry that he could not do
more for me at the time because of pressing obligations
which he had, but because I was in Salt Lake, and I also
needed a little money, that he would let me have two dollars on the account of what he owed my father.
Q.: Did he pay it to you?
A.: Yes, sir, he gave me the two dollars.
Q.: Did you subsequently report that to your father?
A.: Yes, sir, when I returned from Salt Lake."
Mr. Smoot (Tr. 168) admitted the conversation with
the plaintiff's son, and the payment of the $2.00, but does-
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n't admit that it was to apply on any obligation. Certainly the jury was amply justified in believing the son's testimony, and the plaintiff had a right to apply the $2.00
payment on any obligation that was owing from defendants to plaintiff at that time.
We might here also observe that even if the jury had
found that the $3931.30 note was conditionally signed,
still it would operate as a written acknowledgement of
the $2835.00 note and toll the statute of limitations on that
.note. So the defendants are bound regardless of how it
is considered.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
In dis·cussing this poi~nt our contention is that it was error
for the court to even consider this motion for a new trial
as it was not :filed within the time required by law as previously stated. The only .excuse that the appellants give
for their failure to comply with the law is that cousel
didn't know it. That is ·no excuse for the delay. However,
the trial court was clearly right, after entertaining the
motion, in overruling it. Here again we have no quarrel
with counsel's statement of the law. The verdict should
not be set aside unless there is a total lack of evidence to
sustain the verdict. We have previously shown that there
is ample evidence to sustain every question which was put
to the jury and the jury was justified in finding as they
did. They merely followed the instructions of the Court
wherein they were intrusted that they were the sole
judges of the facts, and that if they believed any witSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ness had testified falsely they were at liberty to disregard
the whole of the testimony of that witness. Apparently
the jury believed the testimony of the plaintiff and his
witness rather than the testin1ony of the defendants and
this it had a perfect right to do according to the instructions given. Therefore, we will not enter into an extended
argument on this question as we feel that it has already
been covered.
As shown by the authorities cited by counsel,
one of the main causes for granting a new trial is a miscarriage of justice. We ask this court to examine the
evidence and see if there is any possible miscarriage of
justice in this case. The defendants admit signing of all
the notes sued upon. They admit having received the
money. They say, however, that the money was used for
the be:1efit of the Gordon Creek Coal Company. That is
probably true, and the company probably should pay the
money back if it had any. ~However, the plaintiff cannot
look to that company for his money. He made the loan in
good faith to the defendants, and by doing so, impaired
his own credit. The defendants still claim to have faith
in the coal mine which they developed and claim to own,
and will probably make plenty of·money out of it, if and
when it comes into production. We think these defendants do not want to see the plaintiff lose his money, and
that they would pay it back if they could ·conveniently do
so. However, the fact that they made a poor investment
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should not deny thi·s plaintiff of his right to a judgment
against them.
All of the defenses of the defendants are highly
technical and seek to take every advantage which the law
gives them. They haven't been cheated and they·haven't
been beaten in anyway. It would have been a miscarriage
of justice for the jury to decide any other way than the
way they did decide. The facts <Shown by the evidence
and the law quoted by counsel for appellant and herein
quoted show very clearly that the verdict of the jury and
the judgment of the trial court should be upheld in every
respect.
Respectfully submitted.,

NEWEL G. DAINES,
Attorney foq- Respornilernt.
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